In India, at least six philosophical discourses have been categorised as Āstika philosophy, and six other have been recognised as Nāstika (atheist). The Āstīka philosophy includes: Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiṣeśika, Purvamīmāṃsā and Uttaramīmāṃsā. On the other hand, there are four discourses of Buddhist philosophy– Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Vijñānavāda and Mādhyamika; to these, adding Jaina and Cārvāka philosophy make the number six, in the category of Nāstika philosophy, too.Considering the huge body of Indian philosophy, it can be understood that such a categorisation is merely artificial. Or rather it can be said that, this numbering has been done for classification of the major philosophical paths in the Indian tradition. It is to be noted that in this classification, Advaita Vedānta (Uttara Mīmāṃsā), other dualist philosophies based on the Vedānta, Śaiva philosophy, and Śphoṭavāda, regarding the meaning of terms, have not been classified here. On the other hand, such Nāstika philosophy as Ābhidhārmika and Yogāchāra have been excluded. It is better to say that only the major discourses have thus been classified here.

Though the term Āstika darśana has not been conceptualised in imitation of the English term ̍Atheist̍ Philosophy̍, the meaning of both should have been the same. ̍Theism means faith in the existence of God, and that belief is not only in the existence of God, but it is a matter of faith that he is the cause of the world, the all-powerful authority behind creation, preservation and destruction. and in his embodied or non-embodied form, the ultimate receiver of human worship. The same should have been the meaning, in case of the term Āstika. Considering the literal meaning, it should mean thus– those who believe in the existence of God, are Āstika. But it has not been so in Indian philosophy. The editor of Mādhavacārya̍s Sarvadarśanasaṇgraha, has cited two well-recognised śloka(s) and said, those who do not recognise the Veda as the ultimate proof, and establish non-Vedic decisions in case of scriptural analysis, are Nāstika. Six philosophical discourses including the Cārvāka philosophy. And those philosophical believe in the pramāṇa of Veda, are called Āstika. These are also six in number–
avaidika pramāṇānāṃ siddhāntānāṃ pradarśakaḥ
cārvākādyāḥ ṣaḍvidhāste khyātā lokeṣu kīrtitāḥ
vedapramāṇakānīha prāhurye darśanāni ṣaṭ
nyāya Vaiśeṣikādīni te smṛtā āstikābhidhāḥ.

From this traditional śloka, it appears that in the tradition of Indian Philosophy, it is more important whether one has faith in the proof of Veda, than considering whether one believes in God– in determining the condition for being Āstika. The simple understanding goes like this– those who believes in the existence of God, are Āskika, and those who Nāstika. But if we have to take ̍asti̍ in the sense of the existence of Veda, it becomes somewhat laboured an understanding. On the other hand,

Perhaps the ancient scholars also realised this confusing matter, so an ancient Smṛti-composer like Yājñvalkya gave the meaning of Āstika in a different way. He said, Āstika are those who are respectful — to the idea that God exists or the Veda is the ultimate proof– āstikaḥ śraddhāvānaśca.

As Rādhākṛṣṇan has written “How completely free from traditional religion and bias the systems ar, will be obvious from the fact that the samkhya is silent about the existence of God, though certain about its theoretical indemonstrability. Vaisesika and Yoga, while they admit a supreme being, do not consider him to be the creator of the universe and Jaimini refers to God only to deny his providence and moral government of the world.

In fact, by Āstika darśna, chiefly those philosophic paths which believe in the existence of God, that becomes clear from the speciality of the philosophers. Moreover, argument, logistics, and proof– all these play a great significance in any Indian philosophical discourse, and it is not always understandable the underlying partialities of the philosophers. Dharma, orientation to Dharma and faith in God had always been associated with Indian schools of philosophies. However, such Dharma and faith in God did not cloud the path of argument and discourse.

According to traditional thought, of the six philosophical discourses which are called ̍Nirīsvara̍  (not believing in the existence of God)– two are Pūrva mīmāṃsā and Sāṃkhya.  Dualist Pūrvamīmāṃsā believes in the self-sufficient pramāṇa of Veda, but does not believe in the proof of God. Again, the Dualist Sāṃkhya philosophy does not feel the necessity of accepting God, although they are respectful to the pramāṇa of Veda. There is no contribution of Iśvara in the creation of the world.

If we consider both Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Sāṃkhya somewhat deeply, it can be understood that– regarding the belief in the existence of God, it is more of an external display of the major exponents̍ prowess in discourse and and argumentation, but there is something moresubtle, which tells us that not acceptiong the existence of God is a kind of cliche, and it is only an apparent statement. It can be purposive as well.

Pūrvamīmāṃsā darśana is based on the Karmakāṇḍa of Veda. According to the philosophers of Pūrvamīmāṃsā, Veda is nitya and it is ̍Apauruṣeya̍, that is, ̍not composed by any person̍. That is why, there is no need of accepting the existence of God as the speaker of Veda. It is possibly to establish the self-sufficiency of Veda, and to draw attention to the doctrines of Veda, that any distinctive mention of God seemed unnecessary. According to Mimāṃsaka(s)– the flow of creation is infinite, without beginning and end.

Human beings are mortal, but the mind exists even after death. it can be proved by the utterance of the Śruti. The everlasting mind gets into another body, as a result of karma, and in that body, the enjoyment of the body of the previous birth is complete. The relation between jīva and ātmā is is also endless. Ātmā and Jīva are here similar term.

According to Prabhākara Guru, a major exponent of Mīmāṃsā darśana, ātmā is not conscious, it is inanimate. When it is connected to the mind, ātmā attains consciousness. Desire, envy, happiness and sadness– these are attributes of ātmā that is attached to the mind. According to Prabhākara, in every jñāna (knowledge)– Knowledge, ātmā– which is the base of knowledge, and the subject of knowledge– these three get reflected. So, Prabhākara Mīmāṃsaka(s) are called Tripuṭī Pratyakṣavādī.

On the other hand, Kumārilabhaṭṭa or the Mīmāṃsa-philosophers following Bhaṭṭa, recognise the ātman both as ̍cit̍ and ̍acit̍– conscious and non-conscious. Since even at the time of sleeping, there in not a complete absence of consciousness, and since a person, waking after the sleep, feels that so far I have been sleeping, so by the proof of this feeling, jīva can be called citsvarūpa. Again, at the time of suṣupti, it is not possible to feel the inanimation of anything else other than that of the soul , so the self is both cit and acit, just like the glow of a glowworm, sometimes visible, sometimes invisible. According to Bhaṭṭa, ātman is different from body and indriya(s), but it is vibhu or all-pervading.

Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃṃsaka(s) do not believe in the existence of God, but well-respected Mīmāṃsaka(s) like Kumārilabhaṭṭa and Pārthasārathi Miśra have upheld notions of authority and enjoyment as attributes of ātman. Kumārilabhaṭṭa has written in his Ślokavārtika that to understand Ātmatatva, one should study Upaniṣad. Citing the opinion of Śavarasvāmī, he has written, in order to resolve nāstikyavuddhi, Śavarasvāmī has established the separate entities of śarīra and ātman. But according to him, studying Vedāta-vidyā is important for attaining self-knowledge–
ityāhu nāstikyaṃ nirākariṣṇu
rātmāstitāṃ bhāṣyakṛdatra yuktyā.
dṛḍḥatvametadviṣayaśca vodhaḥ
prayāti vedāntaniṣevaṇena.

Here it is to be noted that the existence of ātman, as testified in Vedānta and Upaniṣd(s) has been recognised by ancient Mīmāṃsaka(s) like Kumārilabhaṭṭa and Śavarasvāmī , but they are not Advaitavādī. According to them, the world is not false. Jīva and Iśvara are not one. They are dualists, but at the same time, they are not of the same opinion with the materialist Cārvāka or other Atheist philosophers. Actually determining ātmatatva is not the subject of Pūrvamīmāṃsā. So they have left it to the philosophers of Uttara-mīmāṃsā.

They remain steadfast to their dualist standpoint, and so that their opinion may not be same with that of the atheist Cārvāka philosophers, they state that ātman is different from body , mind and other tangible objects– after understanding this, one̍s atheist tendency gets away, and one becomes fit to have faith in yoga, paraloka, pāpa, puṇya, and the sense of previous births. This way every human being will perform good deed and discard evil things. Gradually their minds will be pure and they will be entitled to understand the ātmatatva as propagated in Upaniṣad.

From this discussion it becomes clear that Pūrvamīīmāṃā darśna has not denied the existence of God, but since the knowledge of ātman is not its domain, it has not gone into the discussion of God and ātman, with clear purpose behind it. The karma prescribed in Veda can yield the fruits of ultimate virtue, so in order to establish faith in the absolute importance of Veda̍s karmakāṇḍa, the Mīmāṃsaka(s) have not felt the necessity of any discussion about God. It is also to be noted that Jaimini, the Mīmāṃsā-sūtrakāra, has not discussed God, nor has he discussed living creatures. Out of their overarching zeal to establish people̍s faith the deeds prescribed by Veda, the Mīmāṃsaka(s) have not recognised God as omnipotent and omniscient.

Scholars, citing the contemporaneity of the two texts by Jaimini, sūtrakāra of Mīmāṃsā, and Vādaryaṇ Vyāsa, sūtrakāra of Vedānta, have said that in some of the sūtra(s) in Vādārāyaṇ, the opinion of Jaimini gets reflected, similarly in some Mīmāṃsāsūtra(s) by Jaimina, the opinion of Vādarāyaṇ Vyāsa has been expressed. If we consider the opinions of Jaimini mentioned in the Brahmasūtra by Vyāsa, we can find that Jaimini accepts the notion of salvation, and he also accepts the existence of the all-knowing God. But he does not feel the necessity to mention God, already justified in Śruti, in his sūtras. He has promised to talk about Dharma– one of the Caturvarga. So his sūtra-text has been composed, keeping in mind the rituals of dharma. So it has been said– dharmaṃ jaiminirataeva. The number of sūtra(s) Vādarāyaṇ has mentioned as Jaimini̍s opinion, are five or six, such as
para jaiminirmukhyatvāt, darśanācca, na ca kārye pratipattyābhisandhiḥ
avibhāgena drṛṣṭatvāt, brāhmeṇa jaiminirupanyāsādibhyaḥ.

According to traditional philosophical thoughts, like Pūrvamīmāṃsā, Sāṃkhyadarśana, too, does not accept the existence of God.Since there is no contribution of God in the creation of world, there is no point in accepting the existence of God, so Sāṃkhyadarśana is also feferred to as atheist. Now, comes a question, who is the major exponent of determining Sāṃkhya darśana as an atheist philosophy? The obvious answer is Īśvarakṛṣṇa, the composer of Sāṃkhyakārikā. There is no surprise that Sankhyātatvakaumudī, known as an explanatory text of Sāṃkhyakārikā, and another text Yuktidīpikā will also establist the atheist of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. On the other hand, the way Śankara, the Śāriraka commentator of Vedānta darśana has treated Sāṃkhyadarśana and Īśvarakṛṣṇa as his major rival, the atheist orientation of Sāṃkhyadarśana has become all the more established.

Since we are trying to explore different elements of Sāṃkhyadarśana in Mahābhārata-Purāṇa, and in that regard, the historical evolution of Sāṃkhyadarśana becomes important, we cannot mark Sāṃkhyadarśana as ̍atheist̍ only in terms of the kārikā(s) of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. Above all, scholars have noticed four phases while writing about the history of evolution of Sāṃkhyadarśna. And at least in three phases out of that four, the presence of God is rather prominent. Only in the third phase, where there are only the kārikā(s) of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, and where the decisions of his followers are held to be powerful, only there an ̍atheist̍ orientation of Sāṃkhyadarśana can be found. We would like to say– the standpoint of a philosophical discourse, the beginning and end of which regards the presence and authority of God, cannot be completely determined only from a partial standpoint in the middle of its evolutionary process.

Among the four phases in which Sāṃkhyadarśana flourished, the first phase was in association with Veda and Upaniṣad(s). According to timescape, this phase started since the 7th or 8th century AD, and it continued upto the development of Jaina dharma and the beginning of Bauddha dharma. In whatever way the fundamental theories of Sāṃkhyadarśana might have developed in this phase, it seems that the conception of God was never absent in this phase. The second phase covers the Mokṣadharma-parva of Mahābhārata. IN this second phase, there are the Upaniṣad(s) which came after the ancient ones like Chāndogya and Vṛhadāraṇyaka, as well as Caraka-Saṃhitā and texts like Buddha-Carita. There is also the analysis of Sāṃkhyatatva as uttered in Bhagavadgītā and the Mokṣadharma-parva of Mahābhārata.

This phase covers a period from 4th century BC to 1st century AD, and even after. Here also, the existence of Īśvara is quite recognisable. The third phase is, where Sāṃkhyakārikā by Īśvarakṛṣṇa has attained the status of a separate tantra. However, Pātañjala Yogasūtra should also be mentioned here. Moreover, other annotations and commentaries on Sāṃkhyakārikā should also be included here. Scholars have defined this period s the age of classical Sāṃkhya. This period covers from 1st century AD to 10th/11th century AD. It is to be noted that only at the time of this Classical phase, doubts have been raised regarding the existence of God. After that, when there is a revival of Sāṃkhyadarśna– there is hardly any original text on Sāṃkhyadarśana in between 11th century and 15th century– so, when circa 15th century Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya was written by Vijñānabhikṣu, a new dimension was opened up, and it is better to inform the reader that the purpose of this fourth phase was to counter the ̍atheist̍ orientation of the entire Sāṃkhya darśana which had been established during the development of Classical Sāṃkhya , and to establish Sāṃkhya as a God-believing philosophy. Here had been the commentaruy of Vijñānabhikṣu, so as well Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti by Aniruddha and the original commentary by Mahāeva Vedāntī.

The reason to mention the way the phases of the historical evolution of Sāṃkhyadarśana have taken shape, is the very fact that like other Āstika darśana(s), it has not been developed in a properly organised way. In later times, a structure of Sāṃkhyadarśana have been created depending on the way several Sāṃkhya theories have developed in Veda, Upaniṣad(s) and Mahābhārata, but since the Sāṃkhya theories located in Veda-Upaniṣad and Mahābhārata have been equally used by other philosophical texts, so these cannot be exclusively called Sāṃkhya theories. For the same reason, the ̍atheist̍ orientation̍ of what is mostly known as ̍Sāṃkhya̍ cannot be found in Veda-Upaniṣad and Mahābhārata. Rather, from the sūtra(s) used in these texts, it appears that Sāṃkhya philosophy accepts the existence of God. We are coming to that discusson later.

First, it must me made clear that philosophers consider Sāṃkhyadarśana as one of the earliest Āstika philosophies. But in all other philosophical texts, the sūtra-texts are held in a special respect, for Sāṃkhyadarśana has no such sūtra-texts. The sūtra-texts attributed to Paramarṣi Kapila, is actually a text composed much later, as scholars consider it so.

In the traditional discourse of Indian philosophy, the Sūtra-texts are considered as first philosophical treaties in India. In that regard, this Sāṃkhyasūtra does not have the same respectful status as that of Nyāyasutra by Gautama, Vaiṣeśika Sūtra by Kaṇāda Yogasūtra of Patañjali of Jaimini̍s Karmamīmāṃsāsūtra.

In order to understand whether Kapila and other ancient exponents of Sāṃkhyadarśana, or from which standpoint they analysed the theories of Sāṃkhya, we need to explore the sayings related to the genealogy of creation. In some places of these texts, the presence of God has been clearly mentioned, or the existence of some kind of an absolute power, without any adjective, which, if not recognised as Divine power, at least has to be placed above all other tatva(s). In Mahābhārata-Purāṇa or Bhagavadgītā, Prakṛti is always subjugated to God, and referred to as the Māyāśakti of God. The most important thing is, in the consideration of Prakṛti, Puruṣa or other expressed Tatva(s) as ̍Mahat̍, Mahābhārata-Purāṇa has basically followed the tradition of Upaniṣad, so it is difficult to differentiate between the Brahman– approached through Vedānta and the Parama Tatva approached through Sāṃkhya Yoga.

In the discussion of Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Sāṃkhyadarśana, there is so much concern regarding whether they accept God or not, ̎̎that it becomes understandable that being ̍Āstika̍ depends more on believing God, than having faith in Veda. So, philosophical discourses that accept Veda, but do not believe in God– are not to be considered as ̍theistic̍– thus goes the consideration. In fact, if faith in the ultimate proof of Veda is the first condition for being ̍Āstika̍, having faith in God is also an important consideration. Even, people believing in afterlife and rebirth also come within the purview of being Āstika. This is said in Bhagavadgītā — when the attributes of a Brāhmaṇa — śama, dama, tapaḥ, śauca and so on– have been talked about, āstikya has also been mentioned, and there Śrīdharasvāmī has written– those who believe in the world beyond this one,
āstikyamasti paraloka iti niśchayaḥ
Śankarācārya, however, has used the term āgama in stead of Veda, and said, āstikya is the orientation of āstika. To have respect in the āgama(s) is āstikya–
āstikyaṃ āstikyabhāvaḥ śraddhadhānatā āgamārtheṣu.

In Mahābhārata we have seen that Āstika has been used in the sense of having faith in Veda and similar scriptures. Moreover, alongside this meaning, another deeper meaning is associated with the term Āstika, which is called śraddhadadhāna, that is, one who has respect. This respect can be towards utterances of Veda, or in the proof of Veda, or may be towards Īśvara, or towards the word-proof of Śruti and Smṛti, and also towards ancient customs. In the first chapter of the Ādiparva of Mahābhārata, it is said that, if Āstika people start listening to the narration of Mahābhārata from the Anukramaṇikā, they will never fall in distress–
āstikaḥ satataṃ śṛṇvan na kṛccreṣvavasīdati.

In the previous śloka, the qualitative attributes of Āstika are — respectful, oriented to rituals and customs, and always dharma-abiding–

śraddhadhānaḥ sadāyuktaḥ sadādharmaparāyaṇaḥ

Actually the corpus of being respectful is extended upto an extent, where it is said that– even the evil graha(s) avoid people who are within the sphere of Śruti, Smṛti, good habits, self-control and sanctity, that is, they do not suffer under evil planetary influences–

āstikaṃ śraddhādhānañca varjayanti sadā grahāḥ.

In Bhagavadgītā, while explaining the habitual attributes of a Brāhmaṇa, Śrīdharasvāmī talked of faith in afterlife, and the significance of this idea can be realised in Śāntiparva of Mahābhārata. Here it is said that, our forefathers residing in their divine abode, make arrangements for the food of those who are not āstika, such as birds and beasts, cows, horses and other lower-order animals–
anāstikānāṃ bhūtānāṃ prāṇadāḥ pitaraśca ye.

Another version of this śloka reads:
anāstikānāṃ āstikānāṃ prāṇadāḥ pitaraśca ye.

In this reading, it becomes all the more clear that the forefathers make arrangements for food for all– irrespective of āstika and nāstika, by performing Vedic rituals. Thus āstika people please the gods and forefathers by performing yajña(s), and as a result, gods bring rains down, crops grow due to that rain, and all people and creatures get their food due to this. From this śloka it is to be understood that people who are respectful of the Vedic rituals and afterlife, are called āstika, and those who are against this sphere, are nāstika–
vedavādāpaviddhāṃstu tān viddhi bhṛśanāstikān.

In fact, people who believe in Śruti-Smṛti and good conduct, have laid down for all people certain rules of conduct, daily duties, vrata and fasting, restrictions regarding food and copulation with women, and so on– and an overall belief in these rules designates one as āstika, and those who are not respectful of these matters, are nāstika.

At the end of this decision, where comes the refernce to ̍prāyaścitta̍ (attonement), it becomes quite understandable that a lack of concern for what is said in the scriptures, wha is to be eaten and what is forbidden– is called as the nāstika orientation. Mahābhārata has established this notion quite fervently, so that there is also a possibility of returning to ̍faith̍ from the nāstika orientation. It says– if someone intentionally violates the codes of good conduct and rules, the sin one acquires is also heavy, but if omeone commits something wrong without knowlegde, there is a way for making atonement for the wrong done. It is said that, if some āstika, respectful person unknowingly commits some offence, he can be free of the sin by performing the rituals prescribed in texts– which is the act of prāyaścitta. But the notion of prāyaścitta is futile for those who are nāstika, because they are so proud and malicious that they do not abide by any rule–
śakyate vidhinā pāpaṃ yathoktena vyapohitum
āstike śraddhadhāne ca vidhireṣa vidhīyate.
nāstikāśraddadhāneṣu puruṣeṣu kadācana.
dambhadveṣa-pradhāneṣu vidhireṣa na dṛśyate.

At the end of all these, it is also to be noted that if an abiding mentality to Vedic rules, good conduct, respect to Śruti, Smṛti and honest manners denotes the standpoint of being āstika, the practice of Vedic prescriptions ultimately amounts to faith in God, who is the sādhya of Veda. So faith in God completes the circle of āstikya.